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GOVERNMENT RELIEF FOR RISK ASSOCIATED WITH GOVERNMENT ACTION
ABSTRACT
A significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future
government policy.Government action --taxreform, deregulation, judicial
decisions, budgetary shifts-- producesgains and losses for those who
invested under preexisting rules.The effects of government relief --
compensation,grandfathering, phase-ins--onex ante incentives and risk
bearing are examined in a model in which private insurance is taken into
account.It is demonstrated that government relief is inefficient, even when
private insurance is subject to moral hazard, because relief shields





Cambridge, MA 02138A significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future
government action.Government action produces gains and losses --often
amounting to billions of dollars --forthose who invested under preexisting
rules.'Government policy with regard to these effects (often referred to as
"transition policy") varies widely: full compensation for takings of real
property, partial relief through grandfathering and phase-ins for tax reform
and deregulation (in some instances but not others), and no relief for most
budgetary shifts and changes in common law tort rules (as in the products
liability context).
Risk associated with government action, despite its prevalence and
magnitude, has not been recognized as presenting a general problem, and little
attention has been devoted to analyzing the effects and efficiency of
government relief.2For example, in Feldstein's (1976a, 1976b) influential
analysis of losses arising from tax reform,a policy of compensation or other
relief is advocated but no systematic framework in support is offered.Among
the questions that must be addressed in analyzing government relief are
whether insurance markets are able to provide appropriate compensation and how
relief affects investment incentives.
Section 1 presents a model of the purest form of government relief:
compensation (partial or complete).Private insurance markets are assumed to
be present.Because such insurance is available, any allocation of risk that
Because anticipated change is reflected in pre-reform market values, the
problem addressed here arises only when future policy is uncertain.In
addition, any government action that affects the probabilities of future
change, including action not entailing reform --suchas defeat of legislation
or an announcement making future enactment more or less likely --shouldbe
included in the analysis, for such events similarly produce gains and losses
(unless complete relief is anticipated).
2Mostdiscussion arises in the context of tax reform, where inquiry
typically is limited to considerations of horizontal equity.The relationship
between such appeals and the perspective offered here is considered in Kaplow
(1989a)
-1-can be achieved with government relief can also be achievedin the absence of
relief.The provision of relief, however, shields investors from some of the
consequences of their actions, which distorts ex ante investment decisions.
Even when insurance coverage is partial due to the problem of moral hazard and
even when the level of relief is less than the level of insurance coverage
that individuals would otherwise have purchased, relief has this distorting
effect because, at the margin, a portion of the incentive cost is borne by the
government.
Section 2 considers the range of application of these results.First, it
notes that gains produced by government action are subject to the same
analysis as losses, suggesting that windfall taxation should be viewed
symmetrically with compensation (and similarly for other methods by which
gains and losses may be relieved) .Second,the analysis is applied to methods
other than outright compensation by which governments mitigate the effects of
changes in policy.Crandfathering, delayed or partial implementation, and
phase-ins have the same cx ante incentive effects as compensation schemes that
provide equivalent levels of relief.In addition, such mechanisms are
generally more inefficient than direct compensation due to their effect on ex
post incentives.The analysis permits an efficiency ranking of mitigation
schemes.Third, the case for full retroactive application of some new
policies is explored.Finally, the assumptions on which the analysis rests
are examined.Section 3 offers concluding remarks.
1.Ex Ante Analysis of Government Relief
A.The Model and First-Best Outcome
It is assumed that identical risk-averse individuals choose a level of
investment, which determines net benefits in each of two states --one
corresponding to government action and one to inaction --havinga known
probability.3Individuals also choose a level of insurance protection that
The probability of government action is assumed to be fixed.That the
availability of relief may affect government decisionmaking is considered in
-2-covers a portion of their loss, for which they pay an actuarially fair
premium.4The government is committed to a policy of providing relief,
financed by a lump-sum tax, for a portion of losses.
U individual's utility as a function of wealth; U' >0,U" < 0;
k =individual'slevel of investment;
b(k) net benefits (private and social) from investment in state i;the
two states are denoted by "a" for action and "o" for the 'null"
state, or status quo;bj' <0,i =o,a; k such that
b(k) =bh(k)=o;Ab#o,whereab —b0 -b3;
q =portionof loss (b0-b1) covered by private insurance in state 1;
= privateinsurance premium;
g =portionof loss (b3-b1) compensated by the government in state 1;
=lump-sumtax, orcompensation premium"; and
p =probabilityof state a.
An individual's expected utility is
(1)EU (l-p)U(b0(k) - -r)+PWbaOo)
- -r+(q+g)Ab(k))
(l-p)U0 +PUa
where Ua and U0 denote utility evaluated in the states with and without
government action, respectively.The first-best levels of g,q, and k can be
derived from (1) by substituting pgAb --theexpected cost of government
compensation --forr and pqab --theexpected cost of insurance payments --
forir and differentiating:
(2) == (l-p)U[-pab]+pU[-pab+ab] 0,or
(3)p(l-p)(U -U)Ab 0.
section 2D.It is also possible that individuals could influence this
probability (through lobbying, bribery, or investment decisions that affect
subsequent government actions).
It is assumed that insurance companies can observe individuals' aggregate
purchases of insurance.See Arnott and Stiglitz (1987), Pauly (1974).
Given the stated conditions on the second derivatives, if such a k existed,
it would be the optimum and there would be no moral hazard.
6Ifthe optimal investment given no insurance is such that Ab —0,then the
optimum entails no insurance.In this simple case, there is no risk to insure
against in the first instance.
-3-Wealth must thus be equal in the states with and without government action;
hence, q ÷ g 1.The optimal k is determined by
(4) —(l-p)U[b -pith']+pU[b-pAb'+Ab']—0.
Because wealth is equal in the two states, the first-best level of k satisfies
(5)(l-p)b +pb 0.
This means that the first-best level of k maximizes the expected return.
B.First-Best Insurance
There are two instances in which a first-best outcome would be achieved
with private insurance in the absence of government relief.First, when
insurance companies can observe states--whetheror not government action
occurs --afirst-best outcome can be achieved through a state-contingent
lump-sum transfer.The transfer is lump-sum in that the amount is independent
of the gains or losses, and thus independent of the level of investment as
well.Clearly such a scheme has no distorting effect on incentives, while it
can equalize wealth in the two states.
Second, when insurance companies can observe the level of investment (ex
ante or ex post), premiums or coverage can be made a function of investmentin
a manner that fully counteracts moral hazard.For example, a first-best
outcome is achieved with full coverage (q =1)and a premium ir(k) =pqEth(k).
In both cases, government relief would offer no benefits in allocating
risk and would distort ex ante incentives.7The intuition is that investors
base their decisions only on their own exposure to loss --thatportion of the
loss uncompensated by the government -- ratherthan on the total loss.
To demonstrate this, consider the case in which states are observable.It
can readily be demonstrated that, for any g, insurance would entail premiums
of ir0 =p(l-g)Aband lTa= -(1-p)(l-g)txb,with q 0.That is,the investor
If relief were lump-sum--thatis, independent of the level of the loss --
itwould cause no distortion.This is not, however, the typical form of
relief.(E.g., with takings for a highway, it would involve identical
compensation regardless of the value of improvements, unless it were possible
to individualize such lump-sum payments.Insurance accomplishes this result
when states are observable by contracting in advance for a suitable level of
coverage.)
-4-pays p(l-g)Ab in both states, which finances a recovery in the event of
government action of (l-g)txb, producing equal wealth in the two states.The
first-order condition for k is determined taking g,r,q,ir0,and ir8 as given:
(6) =(1-p)IJ(b}÷ pU(b ÷ gab') =0,or
(7)(l-p)b, +pb—-pgAb'
Consider the case of txb' >0--i.e.,government action is associated with a
lower marginal return to investment.6In contrast to the first-best level of
k, given by (5)investors will choose lower expected returns for g >0than
for g0, because they take into account that increased investment will
increase their expected payment from the government by pgAb' Clearly, g 0
is the unique optimum.Moreover, the greater the portion of the loss
compensated by government relief, the greater will be the resulting
inefficiency.
It can be demonstrated that precisely the same results follow for the case
in which levels of investment rather than states are observable.
Proposition 1:If states or investment levels are observed by insurance
companies, the first-best outcome is achieved with no relief (g =0).
Moreover, g =0is the unique optimum, and sign dEU/dg -sign g, for
g c
Proof:SeeKaplow (1987a).
Without government relief, the investor is able to join forces with the
informed insurance company to alleviate all risk and still achieve a first-
best level of investment.The investor's reaction to anticipated government
relief involves both insurance and investment decisions.In these cases,
private insurance will fully, and without moral hazard, cover all of the loss
not covered by relief.The investor and insurance company, however, have no
For b' C0,the direction of the distortion reverses.
For g outside this range, expected utility will be less than for the
corresponding endpoints, but the fall in expected utility need not be monotone
unless further restrictions are made with respect to the b1 functions.
5-incentive to offset the incentive distortion, because it is borne entirely by
the government (r and g are taken as given)
Consider the applicability of first-best insurance.For government
actions that are limited in numbet and readily specified in advance (and
distinguishable ex post), a state-contingent contract should be feasible.'°
Investment levels might also be observable, at least in part.Thus, with the
prospect that the government will level a building in order to build a
highway, insurance premiums could be proportional to the value of the
building.
Note also that the results for first-best insurance will hold when
investors are risk-neutral.In this case, investors need no insurance, so
observability of states or investment levels is not required.This case is
important primarily because, with many government actions, gains and losses
fall largely on investors in widely held corporations, most of whom hold
diversified portfolios.In such cases, as a rough approximation, modeling
tnvestors as risk-neutral might be appropriate.11
C.Second-Best Insurance
When the assumptions of Proposition 1 are not fully applicable -- because
states or investment levels are costly to specify by contract or verify --one
has a two-stage moral hazard problem.12 The simple moral hazard problem [see
For other actions, it may be possible to approximate such results by use
of a proxy variable.For example, with policy changes affecting the prospects
of a defense contractor, myriad possible actions might be indexed by the size
of the defense budget, or that portion of the budget devoted to a particular
sector, such as fighter aircraft.
If the government action imposed systematic risk (which often will not be
the case), it should be noted that, in principle, the government is in no
better position to absorb such risk than are financial markets.See the
discussion in Kaplow (1987a) of the applicability of the results of Arrow and
Lind (1970) in this context.
In this model with only two states, one associated with no loss, the
assumption that states are unobservable is unrealistic; more generally, it
often will be possible to infer something about states or investment levels
from the amount of the loss.The assumption of unobservability corresponds to
an extreme case; the two-state model is retained for simplicity of exposition.
It will be clear that many of the particular results and all the core
intuitions hold more generally.For a model of a context in which complete
unobservability is plausible, see Kaplow (1989b).
-6-Arrow (1963), Holmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979)]is that involving the
insurance compsny and investor when there is no government relief.The
greater the level of coverage, the greater will be the degree to which
investment decisions are distorted.Investors choose the level of coverage
that optimally trades off incentive and risk-bearing costs.
The second stage of the problem is created by the prospect of government
relief.That prospect affects not only investment but the insurance decision
as well.Thus, a complete analysis of the problem in the general case must
take into account the maximizing response in the insurance decision, and how
it,in combination with government relief, will affect investment incentives.
Since it will no longer be the case that the allocation of risk will be
identical (or unimportant) for different levels of government relief, it is
necessary to assess the trade-off between risk spreading and incentives.
Despite the greater complexity of the problem, the basic results emerge
largely intact.It is still the case that government relief induces investors
to behave as though only the uncompensated portion of the loss were incurred.
As a result, in considering a marginal increase in the level of insurance
coverage, individuals receive all the benefits with regard to the reduction in
risk-bearing costs but bear, through the increase in premium, only that
fraction of incentive costs that affects expected insurance payments; they
ignore the effect on the expected cost of government relief.
It is helpful to state explicitly the government's optimization problem
for the situation just described,









-7-In analyzing this problem, it is useful to think of the investor as
choosing total coverage (q +g)
,eventhough the insurance premium will cover
only the portion paid by the insurance company.Thus construed, it is clear
that private insurance can mimic any level of relief:For any g, where q and
k refer to the levels of insurance coverage and investment that would be
chosen, constder the alternative of no relief, insurance coverage of g +q,
and the corresponding level of investment, denoted as i.Itcan readily be
demonstrated that EUI&qkEUI08+q.j and k =I13That is, any level of
relief is equivalent to no relief combined with a corresponding increase in
insurance coverage 14
Theimmediate implication is that g 0 is an optimum, since the utility
achievable at any g # 0can also be achieved at g =0.Uniqueness is
demonstrated in the Appendix.The method involves noting that, at any optimum
for which g #0,the first-order condition for q must hold not only for the
stated g, but also for the equivalent scheme involving no relief, which is not
possible.
Proposition 2:No relief, g =0,is the unique optimum, even when states
and investment levels are not observed by insurance companies.
The intuition behind the inefficiency of government relief in this case is
further illuminated by examining the first-order conditions for the private
maximizing decisions.For optimization over k:
(9)
dEll=(l-p)Ub+ pU[b +(q+ g)Ab'] =0.
Investment is affected by total coverage (q + g).Note, however, that the
incentive cost corresponding to insurance--unlikethat corresponding to
'Begin by considering the possibility that =pqt1b.It is clear that
(8Bii) will be identical for both problems, leading to the same choice of
investment.(This result holds if the solution for (8Bii) is unique, as it
will be in most cases of interest.See note 15.For other cases, it would be
sufficient to assume that, if multiple global optima for k exist, the same
selection rule is used in the inttial and transposed problems.)Thus, ivwill
satisfy (SBi), and the conclusions follow.
14Another way of viewing this result is to observe that the government
optimization problem (choosing g) is the same as the private optimization
subproblem (choosing q) when g =0 --compare(8) and (8B) --exceptthat the
former problem has an added constraint.
-8-relief --isreflected in individuals' insurance decisions because the premium
they must pay is determined by the level of coverage they select.To see
this, determine dtj/dq from (8E), substituting foric(using constraint (8Ei))
and noting that k is a function of q whereas (8E) has g taken as given.
(10) 32 -pqab'kq -pAb]
+ P[2Cq -pqAb'kq -pab+ (q + g)Ab'kq + ab] —0,
where kq denotes the derivative of k with respect to q.The sum of the first
U term and the first and fourth U terms equals zero, based on (9)15
Rearranging terms yields
(11) p(1-p)ab(U -U) -pqb'kqU'=
whereU' (l-p)U + pU.
The first term of (11) indicates the benefits from further equalizing
wealth between the two states.If government action results in a gain or loss
that is not fully mitigated (that is, if q + g < 1), this term will be
positive. 16
ab'kq is the moral hazard effect.Consider the case in which Ab'is
positive.'7This indicates that the marginal return to investment is greater
in the state without government action.In that instance, one would expect an
increase in the level of insurance coverage (which applies in the state
involving government action) to cause an increase in the level of investment,
by making the marginal return in that state, as faced by the investor with
insurance coverage, closer to the return in the state involving no action.18
As explored in Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) and Grossman and Hart (1983)
for this substitution necessarily to be valid, the solution to (9) must be a
unique maximum.The second-order condition (see note 36) is strictly negative
for q + g E [0,1], which covers most cases of interest.This complication has
little effect on what follows, as explored further in Kaplow (198]a).
When Ab is positive (negative), wealth is lower (higher) in state a,so
marginal utility is higher (lower) state a.
17When Ab'is negative, the argument to follow suggests that the sign for kg
is negative.
-9-Optimal private insurance thus trades off risk-bearing and incentive
costs.Government relief distorts this decision because the moral hazard term
is weighted by q rather than q + g:Only that portion of moral hazard
relating to private insurance is reflected in the investor's insurance
decision.
It is also instructive to examine the level of private insurance that
would be selected for any given level of government relief.
Proposition 3:If government relief is less than complete, insurance
coverage is positive but insufficient to provide complete compensation.If
government relief is complete, no insurance is purchased.That is, g < 1
q E (0, l-g) and & =1 q =19
Proof:See the Appendix.
The intuition of Proposition 3 allows one to understand the effects of
relief on private insurance decisions, and therefore on investment as well.
If government relief is less than complete, insurance coverage will be
positive: When q =0,a marginal increase in q reduces risk-bearing costs and
imposes no private incentive costs.Note that q > 0 even when g > q*, where
q* is the optimal level of insurance in the absence of relief.That is,
additional coverage is purchased even when government relief already exceeds
the coverage one would have purchased in its absence.Yet, no matter how high
the level of partial relief, one will not be induced to purchase insurance
that, combined with relief, provides complete coverage:At q —l-g(i.e.
full coverage for one's exposure), a marginal reduction in q entails no risk-
bearing costs and reduces private incentive costs.20
18Due to subtle income effects, this relationship need not hold in general.
For many cases of interest, a sufficient condition would be that U is a
nonincreasing absolute risk aversion utility function.See Kaplow (1987a).
' Also,g > 1 q (l-g, 0).
20For g —1,there is no further risk to spread, and q # 0 imposes two
costs:It creates risk not otherwise present and it creates private incentive
costs.Note that, although q < 0 would diminish total incentive costs, such
costs are borne by the government, so there is no private benefit; in fact
there will be a private cost if q # 0, since, for purposes of private
insurance, incentive costs are defined relative to a baseline that takes g as
given.
-10 -More precise characterizations require further restrictions because of
subtle wealth effects.In the simplest cases, assuming a nonincreasing
absolute risk aversion utility function, Kaplow (198Th) demonstrates that
total coverage (q + g)is greater when (positive) relief is offered than when
there is rio relief.The reason is that, for any level of positive relief, the
risk-spreading benefits of marginally increasing total coverage beyond q* are
the same as in the case of no relief, but the incentive costs, at the margin,
are strictly less when relief is positive.Thus, even though one would expect
insurance coverage to be less the greater is the level of government relief,
the reduction in private coverage (relative to q*) does not fully offset
government relief.Note that even when relief is less than q*, individuals
purchase enough insurance to produce total coverage in excess of q*.
Government relief could have been mimicked by greater private coverage
(with no relief)but was rejected by the investor because the greater risk
spreading was not worth the incentive cost.Because there is no externality
in the private insurance decision, government relief cannot improve upon it.21
ID.Market and Government Risks Compared
It is commonly stated that government relief against losses induced by
market forces --interpretedbroadly to include changes in technology and
consumer taste as well as natural disasters and acts of foreign governments --
isinefficient.Similarly, opposition to windfall taxation --e.g. ,of
extraordinary gains in the case of a successful new product --isbased on the
fact that such windfalls are merely the tail of a probability distribution of
returns that was part of the ex ante inducement for investment.This section
has offered a model equally applicable to market and government risks.The
intuition is that, just as a firm might overinvest if losses caused, e.g. ,by
an unexpected decrease in demand, are expected to be mitigated by the
government, the same effect follows if similar losses caused, e.g., by
21This does not rule out all government action, such as taxes and subsidies
applied to the relevant activities.See Arnott and Stiglitz (1986).For most
instances of government risk, however, it does not appear that there will
generally be a plausible tax/subsidy scheme to offset the moral hazard
produced by private arrangements and exacerbated by government relief.
-11 -increased competition due to decegulation, are to be mitigated.For victualiy
any government policy change imaginable, one can identify a corresponding
action in the market that would produce the same effects on investors.
2.Extensions and Discussion
A.Symmetry of Gains and Losses
All of the analysis thus far (and to follow) is equally applicable to
gains and to losses.When Lb > 0,g > 0 means that losses are (partially)
compensated.Cams correspond to Ab < 0,in which case g > 0 involves
windfall taxation.Thus, at noted in the preceding section, mitigation of
gains tends to produce underinvestment.
This symmetry should be emphasized because in many contexts involving
government risk it is far more common to hear cries for relief for losses due
to government action, but no such demands that gains be taxed away or
otherwise mitigated.Much academic commentary as well has proceeded as though
mitigation of losses were the only issue.In a few contexts, such as the
windfall profits tax accompanying oil price deregulation, gains have been
explicitly taken into account.
Overall, regardless of which concern dominates in a particular instance,
it is important to recognize that both the incentive and risk effects are
fully symmetric with respect to whether gains or losses are involved.Since
most government actions involve both gains and losses, this observation is
relevant to virtually all considerations of government risk.
B.Alternative Mechanisms for Government Relief
Rather than pure schemes of compensation (or windfall taxation),
mechanisms that directly nullify a government action to some degree are more
common.Grandfathering consists of an exemption of preexisting investment.
Partial (scaled-back) and delayed implementation are also employed.Both
reduce the impact of government action, and thus the gains and losses
-12-imposed.22Phase-ins are a hybrid, in which the degree of implementation
increases with the passage of time.Further combinations (e.g., partial
grandfathering, which may expire or be phased-out after a period of time) are
possible.
There are three incentive effects, one ex ante and two ex post, to
consider.The most important point is that all relief mechanisms are like
pure compensation in their effect on ex ante incentives.Although the model
of section 1 purported to be about compensation (and windfall taxation), it
covers these other schemes as well.For example, grandfathering, no
implementation ("partial" implementation at a zero level), and infinite delay
each correspond to full compensation.Intermediate versions of each mechanism
correspond to partial compensation; since the model was general as to levels
of relief, the results are immediately applicable.23
While all mechanisms are qualitatively similar with regard to their ex
ante incentive effects, their cx post incentive effects differ.First, note
that grandfathering and other direct mitigation schemes tend to be more
distorting than equivalent degrees of direct compensation (and windfall
22Moreover, because of typical nonlinearities concerning the effects of risk
and the returns to implementing a policy, it might seem plausible that a
favorable trade-off could be achieved.If the optimal level of implementation
--i.e.,ignoring concerns relating to incidental gains and losses --is
characterized by zero marginal net benefits, the loss from modestly scaling
back might be quite small.In contrast, risk-bearing costs rise
disproportionately with the magnitude of gains and losses.Some such argument
is needed to explain why, if partial reduction or modest delay of a policy
change were desirable, it would not follow that complete abandonment would be
even better.
Zodrow (1981, qualified in 1985) has correctly noted that, because of the
likely decreasing marginal net benefits associated with implementing various
policies, immediate partial implementation is probably preferable to a delay
that similarly mitigates losses from government action, since delay might be
expected to cause a full proportional reduction in net benefits of new policy.
As noted in the text to follow, such considerations are secondary in that they
(partially) address only one of three effects of such mitigation, the others
of which are generally decisive against both forms of relief.
23Some modifications are necessary to account for the differing contours of
alternative strategies.For example, it is well-known that complete
grandfathering amounts to more than full compensation because of the scarcity
effect.This can simply be modeled as g > 1.The only relevant complication
is that the relief offered by some mechanisms may not be a uniform proportion
of the loss, requiring the use of a more complex (nonlinear) compensation
function to make the relevant comparison.For more details, see Kaplow
(1987a)
-13 -taxation) in terms of their ex post effect on old investment.For example, it
is more efficient to compensate directly for the decreased market value
created by a Pigouvian tax than to grandfather, because the latter approach
destroys the corrective effect of the tax on future output.In some instances
(including many in the income tax context) there may be no such future effects
once the past investment decision has been made; in all others, pure
compensation/taxation schemes will dominate these alternatives (unless
administrative cost considerations alter the balance)24
With respect to ex post effects for new investment, grandfathering schemes
differ from delay or partial implementation (to an extent achieving the same
degree of relief).Because grandfathering, unlike the latter schemes, does
not provide any relief for post-reform investment, it is more efficient in
that it avoids an additional cx post distortion: that is,it achieves the
benefits of the government action as to new investment sooner or to a greater
extent.It is thus difficult to justify, except on administrative grounds,
most delay or partial implementation schemes commonly observed in many
contexts, since they could be converted into equivalent grandfathering
schemes -
Theconclusion is that all mechanisms for relief are subject to the same
analysis with regard to the central issue examined here: the efficiency of ex
ante decisions.In addition, when government relief is to be provided, the
available mechanisms can be ranked by the inefficiency they produce, making
possible equivalent relief at less cost.
C.Retroactive Application
Thus far, the analysis has indicated the efficiency of inunediste, full
implementation with no other government relief.In some instances, however,
24Grandfatheringand delayed or partial implementation schemes avoid the
need to value particular investments, and thus are typically simpler.In
addition, delayed or partial implementation may be simpler than
grandfathering, the latter requiring that one distinguish old from new
investment, which could be complicated in some contexts.Interestingly, this
administrative ranking is the reverse of the ranking on incentive grounds,
although the simplest scheme of all --nomitigation --isalso the best in
terms of incentives.
-14 -the ex ante analysis implies that retroactive application would be efficient.
For example, if an activity is found to have negative external effects that
have existed for some time, it would be optimal not only to tax future
production (or otherwise regulate the activity) but to charge for the past
harm caused.The anticipation of such retroactive application is necessary to
align ex ante incentives, particularly since private actors will sometimes
have had (or might have been able to obtain) better information than the
government at the time their previous investment decisions were made.Common
law tort liability --e.g.for newly discovered hazardous activities --often
functions in this manner.
Retroactive application is efficient when new information available to
government decisionrnakers suggests that past circumstances were different from
what the government previously believed.By contrast, it is inefftcient where
circumstances themselves have changed --forexample, where changed water flow
patterns make discharges that were harmless in the past detrimental in the
future.
This dichotomy is illuminated by considering a hybrid case.Suppose that
a new analysis indicates that a highway should have been built twenty years
ago, which would have entailed leveling a set of buildings.It would be
inefficient to tax the interim earnings on investments in such buildings
because, given that the highway was not built, the return on such buildings
was socially as well as privately valuable.If building the highway is still
desirable, it would be efficient to level the buildings now, without
compensation for future earnings.Given the actual timing of the highway
project, this policy provides investors, ex ante, with an earnings stream
reflecting the social value of investment in buildings in the path of the
future highway.The treatment of this hybrid case arises naturally from
understanding that the new information was, by assumption, relevant to the
value of the buildings only insofar as it led the government to build the
highway.That event constitutes a change in ctrcumstances as of the time the
highway is built, making applicable the branch of the analysis under which
retroactive application is inefficient.
-15 -Note that retroactivity does not merely present a special case.Rather,
the analysis of this issue is necessary to define 'immediate" implementation,
and thus the meaning of "no relief" as well, since delay, as section B noted,
is itself a form of relief.
D.Premises of the Analysis25
1.The policy concerning government relief.At the core of the ex ante
approach is the assumption that the government relief to be provided is fully
anticipated.This is equivalent to assuming that the government consistently
and credibly follows a given relief policy, at least in each identifiable
context,If inconsistent policies could be maintained, it would be optimal,
ex ante, to announce no relief, but, ex post, to remedy any gap between the
partial relief obtained under second-best private arrangements and full
coverage.25Presuiably, such a policy could not be credibly maintained.
Given the repeat nature of the process of policy change in many contexts
and the wide range of institutional mechanisms, it seems plausible that a
government could commit to a consistent policy toward relief.If so, the
analysis here suggests which one would be most efficient.Note, however, that
the long-run optimal policy is not necessarily appropriate ex post when no
such policy has previously been announced.But in considering any
prescription based on ex ante effects, one must address how to reach the long
run and whether action, ex post, consistent with the policy one ultimately
seeks to establish is helpful or necessary in establishing the desired
reputation.27
2.Optimality of underlying government action.The welfare
characterizations (in contrast to the analysis determining behavior) assumed
that there was no divergence between the private and social returns to
25Kaplow (1987a) addresses these and other assumptions in greater depth.
26Thus, government relief poses the general time-consistency problem
explored in Kydland and Prescott (1977)
27If any commitment could be made credibly, the optimal policy would be to
announce immediately that, forever after, there would be no relief (the long-
run optimal policy), but to provide full compensation/windfall taxation for
the losses and gains engendered by the announcement itself.
-16 -investment.This assumption will often hold regardless of the desirability of
the underlying government action.For example,the social value of buildings
destroyed for a highway project is zero after their destruction regardless of
the wisdom of the project.
In other instances, the efficiency analysis is dependent upon the
desirability of the new policy, as when the value of an investment is reduced
by a Pigouvian tax.Thenthe welfare results for relief require the further
assumption that the government action was,tn relevant respects, desirable.
Assuming the opposite --thatmost or all policy changes are undesirable --
leadsto a simple contrary prescription: government mitigation, as by infinite
delays in implementation, that maximally disrupts all change.The efficient
government policy assumption, where necessary for the welfare analysis, serves
to highlight optimal relief policy as an adjunct to optimal underlying
substantive policy.28
The model also assumes that the policy toward relief does not influence
the determination and implementation of underlying policies.This need not be
the case.It is sometimes suggested that requiring relief would impede bad
reforms or make good reforms politically feasible --althoughthe opposite
effects are also possible.For example, it may be that a government agency
undervalues the costs of its projects, stnce costs are not directly borne by
the relevant decisioninakers.Although many difficulties with this argument
are often overlooked --mostobviously that benefits may also be undervalued
--theresult of accepting it is that the complete government problem entails
an incentive trade-off:Further relief requirements would improve the
agency's incentives at the expense of private incentives.As another example,
government relief will facilitate enactment of reforms when powerful losers
need to be bought off.Thus, in the context of deregulation, some suggest
that entrenched interests be bribed into accepting the more efficient policy.
The ex ante analysis indicates that more than distribution is at stake if such
28In addition, the analysis in such instances implicitly assumes that
efficiency rather than distributional objectives motivate the government
action.Relief is relatively uninteresting in the latter case:Full relief
for a tax scheme used to finance welfare programs would tax back all the
welfare benefits and compensate losers by returning all tax payments.
-17-pay-offs are to become a habit.See Kaplow (1987b).4oreover, within the
political process itself, an ex ante perapective may suggest that the
willingness ex post to buy off such opposition will increase ex ante rent
seeking that initially creates such inefficient policies.See McKenzie
(1986).
3.Additional market imperfections.The analysis adnitted no market
imperfections other than the information problems producing moral hazard.
Transaction and administrative costs may also be relevant.Arrangements for
each of the myriad possible risks may be quite expensive through individual
insurance contracts, necessarily made ex ante, whereas government relief,
being ex post, need only be made available when government action results.Of
course, the same can be said (as with most other imperfections) for
conventional market risks, where the argument for government mitigation may he
as strong.29One response is a single insurance policy that covers a wide
range of risks.In addition, such transaction costs, combined with the moral
hazard problems emphasized here, may contribute to the prevalence of
diversification rather than particularized insurance to deal with a large
range of observed risks, both market- and government-induced.
The model also assumed that individuals accurately assess risk.Consider
instead the extreme case where individuals mistakenly believe the probability
of action to be zero.There would be no adverse ex ante incentive effects
from government relief (investment decisions are already distorted) ,and
private insurance would not have been purchased (because any premium would
seem too high).3°This parallels one case for disaster relief.But
compulsory insurance is more efficient than simple ex post relief,31 as the
One difference, noted above, is that relief through grandfathering, delay,
and direct mitigation is probably simpler than compensation; analogs are not
available with regard to some private risks.
30The government having better information does not itself justify relief,
as the information may be made available to private actors.The example
assumes transmission is too costly, due, for example, to psychological
characteristics that limit processing of information that comes in simple,
summary form.See Kunreuther et al.(1978); Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky
(1979).
31To avoid the incentive problem examined here for any who perceive a
posittve probability of incurring a loss, the premium charged would have to
-18 -requited ex ante payment of the premium in many contexts will induce mote
efficient ex ante investment even by actors who continue to misperceive the
probabilities.For example, one contemplating construction of a building in a
flood plain or in a zone likely to be condemned soon for a highway would act
diffetently if required to pay in advance an insurance premium reflecting the
probability of adverse events.Note, therefore, that government insurance --
voluntaryor compulsory --isfundamentally different from government relief.
The model also ignored problems of adverse selection, which, unlike moral
hazard, may suggest the efficiency of government relief.32Adverse selection
only arises, however, when probabilities are specific to individuals and known
only to them, both unlikely with govetnment policy changes of general
applicability.It is possible that adverse selection problems could act in
synergy with moral hazard in some contexts.For example, a firm may have
unique knowledge as to the likelihood its products will be banned or the
magnitude of loss that will result, in large part because its actions in
researching and developing the product --actionsaffecting this probability
--generateprivate information.
3. Concluding Remarks
This investigation indicates that government relief of all forms --
whetherfor gains or losses --distortsthe efficiency of ex ante decisions
concerning risk spreading and incentives in the same way that government
relief for market risks would distort behavior.In many instances, such
relief distorts investment incentives in the process of achieving risk
mitigation that private parties could have accomplished efficiently --as
where investors can diversify their holdings or enter into first-best
insurance arrangements.The result is that the benefits of market
arrangements are discarded to an extent that rises with the level oftelief.
depend upon other insurance coverage or supplementary coverage wouLd have to
be banned.
32SeeDahlby (1981) . Reliefshould be contrasted with other government
activity, such as subsidizing goods purchased in too little quantity due to
moral hazard.See note 21.
-19 -In other cases, where moral hazard renders private arrangements second-best,
relief distorts the trade-off between risk and incentives.
The problem of government risk arises in a wide range of contexts.33With
evolutions in common law tort doctrine, it is common for there to be no
relief, and somettmes retroactive application, as when damages are assessed
for prior harm caused by acts not previously viewed as violating the law.For
takings, there is full compensation (though virtually no taxation of gains).
The most plausible justification for this practice may relate to concerns
about the incentives of government actors.34For tax reform and regulatory
reform, the wide mix --grandfathering,phase-ins, and no relief -- mightbest
be explained by the balance of political forces, although the analysis here
casts doubt on the efficiency of such relief and suggests that, if
unavoidable, such pay-offs often may be accomplished more efficiently by
choosing different mechanisms.For budgetary shifts35 and many other
government actions, there is no relief, perhaps because many such policy
changes are seen as more akin to market risks for which government assistance
is less common.Previously, it has not been recognized that these widely
varying contexts raised many of the same questions.
When substantial government relief is to be offered, whether because the
assumptions of the model do not apply or because political forces make relief
unavoidable, the analysis here offers three insights.First, charging a
premium ex ante may help preserve incentives, as illustrated with disaster
relief and takings.Second, banning supplementary insurance may avoid the
inefficiency that arises from the maximizing response that entails additional
private risk mitigation.Such analysis might be applied to government
These examples and others are considered further in Kaplow (1986, 1987a,
1987b).For partial analyses of the example of government takings, see also
BlumeandRubinfeld (1984) and Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984).
When the constitutional requirement of just compensation was adopted,
insurance and other financial markets were not well developed.Nearly full
compensation may well have been efficient in many contexts, viewed solely in
terms of risk and incentives.Fears of abuse of power, however, more directly
relate to the origins of the provision.
Government contracting is also amenable to the analysis presented here,
although additional considerations involvtng asymmetric information must be
taken into account.
-20 -insurance programs, such as Medicare.Third, carefully selecting among relief
policies may limit inefficiency, as mechanisms that provide equivalent relief
generally give rise to different incentive costs.
-21 -Appendix
Proposition 2: Proof of Uniqueness
At a global optimum, g, the first-order condition for q (11) must hold.
The discussion of (8) implies that it must also hold for (— 0,4— g+
since g is assumed to be a global optimum.Moreover, EU — andk —, so
(11) can equal zero in both cases only if qk
Taking the derivative of the first-order condition (9) with respect to q
and regrouping yields
(Al) kq{(l-p)Ubg + (1-p)bUg[b -pqAb']+ pU[b+ (q + g)ab"] +
+ p[b + (q + g)ab'U[b + (q + g -pq)abn]]
=pab(1-p)bUg -pUAb' -pab(l-p)[b+ (q + g)Ab']U.
It simplifies matters and aids interpretation to separate the terms
corresponding to Ukk, which denotes d2EU/dk2.36The bracketed term on the left
side of (Al) thus becomes
(A2) Ukk -pqAb'[(l-p)bUg+ p(b + (q +g)Ab']U].
Using this result,(Al) can be rewritten as
(A3) kqtUkk -qG] U
The discussion of (8) implies that 0, 0, and Ukk are identical for both
scenarios because each term depends only on q + g, U, and k.Therefore, we
can equate
(A4) kq[Ukk -q9}q[Ukk -q9].
Factoring, we have
36
d2E 2 (l-p)TJb + (l-p)TJgb+ pU•[b; + (q+g)Ab"J + pU[b +(q+g)Ab'j2.
-22-(A5) -8JkqUkk/4 -fl
Fromthe requirement that qk =kq,it follows that q — Recalling that
g + q,the conclusion is that g =0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Begin with the case of g c 1.q —0can be ruled out by reconsidering the
first-order condition for maximization over q:
(11) p(l-p)Ab(TJ -U) -pqAb'kqlJ'=0.
For q C (l-g),q + g C 1, which implies that the first term is positive:
First, note that the difference in wealth between the two states is
(q + g -1)ab.Therefore, zlh > 0 (b < 0) implies that the difference in
marginal utilities is positive (negative).At q —0,(11)is positive.
For g ￿ 1, consider q C 0 as a possible optimum.Let k be the optimal
investment given q.Compare the utility level thus resulting with the utility
produced by the same k and q 0.The difference in expected wealth between
the two cases is simply -it+pqb, which equals zero (8Bi).ut for g ￿ 1 and
q < 0,the spread in wealth is greater than with q =0,so expected utility
must be less.Therefore, q C 0 also cannot be an optimum.
Finally, consider the possibility that q + g 1.First, if q + g =1,
wealth is equal in the two states, so the first term in (11) equals zero.The
sign of the second term can be determined from (Al), noting that q + g =1
implies b = The right side terms in (Al) are zero except for the
"This derivation implicitly assumed qkq '0,U '0,and that qkq arid qfcq
are not both infinite.If qk =0,for (11) to equal zero, it must be that
marginal, and thus total utility is equal in each state, which holds only if
q + g 1.In that case, the utility equals that at (g —0,q —1).
Proposition 3 demonstrates that g —0q < 1, ruling this out.Inspection of
U (see note 36) readily demonstrates that a sufficient condttion for it to
be strictly negative is q + e [0,1] .Proposition3 and the discussion
following (8) guarantee that c (0,1) and—q + g, so that, at an optimal
g,this holds.Finally, given g, for qkq and qkq both to be infinite, both kq
termsmust be infinite.From (A3), this requires Ukk -qO 0 and
- — 0.This is only possible if q —, thedesired conclusion, or
9 —0and Ukk —0simultaneously, the latter just having been ruled out.
-23 -second, which is strictly negative (positive) in the case where Ab' >0
(Ab' < 0), and the second and fourth terms on the left side equal zero, with
the other terms strictly negative, so kq >0(kq < If q #0,q +g—1
is thus not an optimum, and a smaller q is locally preferred.And q —0,with
q +g=1,contradicts that g < 1.
Consider q +g>I;i.e.q >l-g.Let k be the optimal investment under
that scheme, and kbethe optimal investment when q +g 1.In (9), the
bracketed part of the second term equals b +(q+g-flAb' .Forthe case
where 11b' >Q,40since an optimum requires (9) to equal zero, it must be that
b() < 0.By assumption, b< 0.Therefore, >k.Comparethe utility
level at q andwith that at q =1-gand . >kimpliesthat expected
wealth is greater at q =l-gand ,becauseall b's are the same (since the
same k is assumed) and the change in the insurance policy produces a gain in
expected wealth because the cost per unit of remaining coverage is less (since
the level of investment associated with q =l-gis less).Moreover, the
greater expected wealth is distributed perfectly equally between states when
q —l-g.These two effects imply that the utility level is greater as well,
which rules out the possibility that q >l-gcan be an optimum.41
It now follows as well that g= l q —0.At g= 1,q =0implies that
(11) equals zero (as both terms equal zero).q < 0 was ruled out above.
q >0is ruled out by the argument just presented that q >l-gcannot be an
optimum.Therefore, at g =1,q =0is the optimum.
38Thebracketed portion of the second term in (9) is
b +(q+g)Ab'=b+l(b -b)=b
Therefore,(9) reduces to U'b =0.
The possibility that Ab' =0needs no special consideration, as it is
clear from (9) that this would only occur if b =b0, which was ruled out
by assumption.
40Forthe case where Ab' < 0, the relationship between the levels of
investment discussed in the text to follow is reversed, but this also produces
greater expected wealth in the case where q —i-gdue to reduced premiums (the
combination of the greater k and the reversed sign of b' produces the same
effect as the lower k and Ab' >0).The remainder of the argument in text
thus holds in this case as well.
41Theproof for g >1follows that for g < 1, mutatis mutandis.
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